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Introduction
How do macroeconomic adjustment policies that alter the price environments of rural households
affect the balance of bargaining power between women and men in them?  How do changes in the balance
of bargaining power induced by such policies mediate the policies'  impact on households' agricultural
production, income and their members' physical well-being?  This paper explores these two main questions
for the case of West African export crop producing households.
Answering the questions requires a full understanding of decision making in West African
households, which is marked by a clear separation of male and female decision making spheres.  Most
resources owned in aggregate by households are controlled and allocated separately by adult household
members.  Husbands and wives generally control separate portions of total household income and allocate
it among day-to-day expenditures without consulting their spouse, i.e., households are non-income-pooling. 
Following a gender division of expenditure responsibilities, each spouse tends to allocate income to
different sets of goods and services.  In addition, the spouses manage their own income generating activities
independently of one another.  Most agricultural production takes place on households' "communal" fields
for which the husband is the manager but all household members are expected to provide labor.  The
spouses may then manage their own personal production activities, for which they provide the majority of
the labor (Guyer, Fapohunda).  
Wives and husbands both contribute to the maintenance of household members' physical well-
being, i.e., to "well-being provisioning".  Both are responsible for providing goods (e.g., food and
medicines) to the process.  Following a gender division of labor, however, it is generally wives alone who
provide the time in reproductive activities that is so crucial to health and nutritional well-being, especially
of children.  Examples of these activities are birthing and care of children, food processing and preparation,
gathering fuel wood and water, maintaining cleanliness, and care of elderly and ill members.￿
While most day-to-day resource allocation decisions are taken separately by husbands and wives,
decisions over the share of total household resources--both income and household members' time--
controlled individually by each generally involves some negotiation.  Negotiation is especially likely in the
face of any major change in households' economic environments.  For example, conflict-laden negotiations
between husbands and wives over who bears the labor costs and who reaps the income benefits arising
from the dramatic increases in cash crop production that have occurred in the region over the last few
decades have been documented (Whitehead).  
It is in negotiations over resource control that bargaining power becomes an important factor:  the
person with the greatest bargaining power will control the larger share of household income and time.  In
turn, who controls household resources has implications for how they are allocated.  Because women have
more limited access to productive resources from outside of their households than do men, their life options
outside of marriage are more limited than men's.  Women thus tend to have lower bargaining power than
men (Stamp), and resource control negotiations are settled in favor of men.  Nevertheless, women do have
some degree of bargaining power through viable alternatives to their current marriages, as evidenced in the
frequency of wife-instigated divorce (Funk).
The balance of bargaining power in households is not set in stone, however.  Indeed, it can be
altered by policy-induced changes in households' economic environments (Haddad et al.).  Many
macroeconomic adjustment programs in West Africa have contained agricultural price liberalization
components in which the prices of exportable cash crops (e.g., palm nuts, cotton) produced on male-
managed communal fields have increased.  Because the outside options of men are improved when these
crops' prices are increased, the balance of bargaining power in households is implicitly tipped further in
favor of husbands. 
Traditional analyses of the effects of output price changes have only considered their feasibility











However, a shift in the balance of bargaining power between wives and husbands in households will induce
additional changes in all household resource allocation outcomes, including crop production, household
incomes, and household members' health.  How big are the bargaining power components of price effects
compared to their feasibility components?  What difference do they make to policy impacts on production,
income and physical well-being?  These questions are difficult to answer since bargaining power is not
easily measured.  However, using a game-theoretic model of intrahousehold decision making and simulation
techniques, this paper takes the first steps towards answering using the example of agricultural price
liberalization in Burkina Faso in the early 1980s.
The Role of Bargaining Power in Household Decision Making
The role of bargaining power in decision making in rural West African households can be
elucidated by a formal game-theoretic model of a non-income-pooling agricultural household.   The
1
commonly polygynous West African household is simplified to consider a unit composed of two decision
makers: a woman (agent i=f) and her husband (agent i=m).  Production activities include communal (c) as
well as the personal production (p) of each agent, with technologies represented by production functions
Q (T , T , V ), and Q (T , V ), i=f,m.  Inputs T  and T , i=f,m are the agents' time inputs;  V  and V cc c c p p p c p c  p
fm i ii i i i
are non-labor inputs.  Prices of personal and communal output are given by q=(q , q , q ), and non-labor cp p
fm
input prices are given v=(v , v , v ). cp p
fm
The maintenance of household members' physical well-being is modelled as a non-market
production process (Reid, Becker).  A well-being provisioning function is given by:
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reproductive activities and the X , i=f,m are "well-being inputs" purchased by agent i.   r
i
Agent f and agent m face the following time constraints:
where T  is agent i's leisure time and T is each agent's total time endowment.  The condition on T   o r
i m
reflects women's specialized reproductive role.  The agents' expenditures among income-generating
productive inputs (V ), well-being inputs (X ) and consumption goods (X ), the latter two at prices p pr o
ii i  i
=(p , p ), i=f,m, must equal their receipts from income-generating activities, plus their exogenous incomes ro
ii
(denoted E), and net receipts of income transfers from the other agent.  The household member who is the
i
manager of an activity receives the income generated from it.  Agent f's receipts come from her personal
production alone, while agent m receives income from both (his) personal production and household
communal production.  Agent f's and agent m's income constraints, respectively, are 
The variable "t" is an income transfer from agent m to agent f.  Note that agent m receives income from 
an activity (Q ) to which agent f's labor (T ) is devoted. cc
f
Utility is assumed to be a function of physical well-being (W), purchased consumption goods (X , o
i
i=f,m), and agents' leisure time (T , i=f,m).  To allow for preference heterogeneity between the agents, o
i
individualized utility functions are specified as follows:
Decision making is modeled as a two-stage game (Carter and Katz).  The first stage represents
ongoing day-to-day decisions marked by the characteristic West African household separate-spheres
structure.  Agent m's unilateral decision variables are ! = (X  X , V , V , T , T , T ), and agent f's
m mm mmmm
o ,  rc popc
are  != (X  X , V , T , T , T ).  In the second stage, bargaining over resource control takes place.  In a
ff f f f f f
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practical sense, such bargaining manifests itself in negotiations over two key variables:  women's time in
communal production and income transfers from husbands to wives (Smith).  The bargained variables are
!  =(T , t). bc
f
First-stage resource allocation decisions are modelled as a Nash noncooperative game.  Agents take
resource allocation decisions unilaterally given their expectations of the other agent's behavior.  Agent f
chooses ! to maximize utility in (5) (with i=f) subject to (1), (2, i=f) and (3), given fixed ! .  Similarly,
f  m
agent m chooses !  tomaximize (5) (with i=m) subject to (1), (2, i=m), and (4) given fixed ! .  Both agent's
m   f
decisions are conditional on ! , which are held fixed.  The first-stage game yields reaction functions of the b
form R=R(p, q , v , T -T , E+t | ! ) for agent f's choice variables and R =R (p , q , q , v ,v T , E -t
ff fff ff f m mm mm m    f m  
pp c pc pc c
|  ! ) for agent m's.  Reduced-form equations for ! , !  for every combination of T  and t are:
ff m f
c
They are functions of the prices faced by the agents, the amount of agent f's time controlled by each agent,
and the income they control. 
The second-stage negotiation over !  =(T , t) is modeled as a Nash cooperative bargaining game in bc
f
which the outcome depends on the relative bargaining powers of the agents.  First-stage indirect utility
functions (denoted V) conditional on ! serve as the utility metric for second-stage decision making. Agents'
i
b 
bargaining powers are represented by their fall-back positions, defined to be the maximum utility they
would receive in the event of divorce.  In such a situation no transfers of income would take place between
the agents (t=0), no labor would be provided by agent f to communal production (T =0), and agents' (first- c
f
stage) resource allocation decisions would no longer be interdependent.  Agent f's fall-back position is given
by 0( p,  q,  v,  E ,  ￿ ).  Agent m's is given by  0 (p , q , q , v , E , ￿ ).  The positions are functions
f fff f f m mm mm m
111 1 1 c 1
of the prices agents would face, 5 = ( p,  q,  v) ,  a n d  5 (p , q , q , v ), their exogenous incomes, 1  111 1  1   1 c 1
f fff mmm m
and nonmonetary variables ￿, i=f,m that affect their utility in the event of divorce (McElroy).  Note that
iN(T
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        Individual rationality (V- 1 > 0, i=f,m) is assumed.  
2i i
￿
          (7)
    (8)
    (9)
   (10)
agent m's fall-back position is a function of q , the output price of communally-produced crops. c
Agents f and m jointly choose !  to maximize a Nash objective function: b
The function is the product of the agents' gains from membership in the joint decision making unit: the
difference between their current utilities and fall-back positions 1.   The higher an agent's fall-back
i2
position relative to current utility, the greater the agent's preferences influence the negotiated outcome. 
The second stage of the game yields reduced-form equations for t and T  as follows: c
f
Final reduced-form equations for the agents' unilateral decision variables are derived by substituting (8) 
and (9) into equations (6).  These reduced-form equations take the form:
The first main question of the paper--How do macroeconomic adjustment policies that alter the
price environments of rural households affect the balance of bargaining power between women and men in
them?--can now be answered.  For agricultural production in particular, the effect depends on who manages



































   (11)
output price of a crop managed by a man (q , q ) is increased, then the man's bargaining power is cp
m
enhanced relative to his wife's.  If the output price of a crop managed by a woman (q ) is increased, then p
f
the woman's bargaining power is enhanced relative to her husband's. 
The second main question of the paper--How do changes in the balance of bargaining power
induced by such policies mediate the policies' impacts on households' agricultural production, income and
members' well-being?--can also be partially answered.  Equation (10) aids us in isolating the effects of
changes in bargaining power from their feasibility effects for any decision variable ! .  The partial
*
derivative of (10) with respect to q , for example, is: c
                                  |___|     |_______________|    |_______________________|
                                    A                     B                                        C
                                   feasibility effects                        bargaining power effect
     
The direct feasibility effect of the price change (term A) is that brought about through the release
of agent m's budget constraint (equation 4) holding the resource control variables and agents' fall-back
positions constant.  The indirect feasibility effect (term B) is the additional effect allowing T  and t to vary c
f
(thus shifting equations 2(i=f), 3 and 4) while still holding the fall-back positions constant.  Term C gives
the remaining effect induced by a shift in the balance of bargaining power in favor of agent m and resulting
changes in T  and t.  Changes induced in decision variables (vectors !  and ! ) will in turn induce changes c
f fm
in agricultural production, income, and well-being.￿
Agricultural Liberalization in the Cotton Belt of Burkina Faso:  
Quantifying the Effects of Policy-induced Changes in Bargaining Power
This section uses the above model to simulate the feasibility and bargaining power effects of
macroeconomic adjustment in Burkina Faso taking place from 1981 to 1985.   An  agricultural price
liberalization component of the adjustment program led to a 60% rise in the price of communally-produced
cotton, Burkina Faso's main export crop, and a 120% rise in the price of chemical fertilizer, greatly
enhancing the profitability of cotton production overall.  Liberalization took place through a combination of
exchange rate devaluation and price decontrol (Savadogo and Wetta).  
The simulation model employed is parameterized using data collected by the International Crops
Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics from monogamous households in Burkina Faso's cotton belt
complemented with secondary data.  Communal cotton and food production functions are specified as
Cobb-Douglas.  The utility functions and well-being provisioning functions are Stone-Geary. Personal
income-generating activities are assumed to be remunerated at fixed wages.  To determine an appropriate
degree of intrahousehold preference heterogeneity and base-case balance of bargaining power, a validation
exercise based on six differing degrees of preference heterogeneity (ranging from none to "high") and six
differing balances of bargaining power (ranging from one highly in favor of the husband to one in which the
spouses have relatively equal bargaining powers) is undertaken.  Of the thirty-six resulting scenarios, one
of high preference heterogeneity and bargaining power moderately in favor of husbands is found to conform
most closely to the case of (monogamous) cotton producing households in Burkina Faso.  It is this scenario
on which the following analysis is based.  The simulations are undertaken using nonlinear mathematical
programming and grid search techniques (Smith).  
A breakdown of the effects of the price changes on various variables of interest is given in Table 1. 
First consider changes in the spouses' utilities and fall-back positions.  The price increases lead to a 7.8%
increase in the wife's utility and an 18.5% increase in the husband's (column 7). While both spouses gain￿
from the price increases, due to his bargaining power advantage, the husband gains more than the wife. 
Because the profitability of an income generating activity managed by husbands was enhanced, it is the
husband who also gains in bargaining power.  The husband's fall-back utility increases by 17.5%, while the
wife's does not change, tipping the balance of bargaining power further in his favor.
 
Table 1.  Simulated Feasibility and Bargaining Power Effects of Adjustment Policy-Induced Price
Changes, Burkina Faso (1981-85)
Variable Pre- Direct Indirect Barg- Total Post- Percent
Adjust- Feasib- Feasib- aining Effect Adjust- Change
ment ility ility Power ment (%)
Level Effect Effect Effect Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Utility
Wife's utility** 399 33.3 90.4 -62.7 31 430 7.8
Husband's utility** 667 128 -83 79 124 791 18.6
Bargaining Power
Wife's fall-back          315 -- -- 0 0 315 0
utility** 
Husband's fall-back    607 -- -- 106 106 713 17.5
utility**         
Resource Control
Income transfer ('000s 10.5 -- 32.5 -13.5 19 29.5 181
francs CFA)*




Cotton production (kg) 1131 252 209 -4.9 456 1587 40
Income ('000s CFA) 178 57.5 16.8 0.2 74.5 252 42
Physical Well-being** 167 8.32 13.79 -7.12 15 182 9
Table Notes:
* CFA francs are those issued by the Communauté Financière Africaine.  The 1982 exchange rate was 325 CFA
per $US.
** These variables have no measurable units.  While their levels have no significance for model simulation
outcomes, changes in them do. ￿￿
How do the price changes affect resource control in the household?  Because the husband's income
constraint has been released, greater income is available to allocate among both the goods he purchases and
income transfers to his wife.  The (indirect) feasibility affect is thus positive, increasing the income transfer
by 32,500 CFA.  However, because the husband's bargaining power has increased relative to the wife's, he
is able to bargaining the income transfer down by 13,500 CFA.  Thus the increase in the income transfer is
only 19,000 CFA.  With respect to control over the wife's time, the feasibility and bargaining power effects
are both positive.  Because cotton production has become more profitable, both the wife and husband will
see it in their interests to increase the amount of the wife's time in its production.  However, since the
husband receives income from the labor, he will have greater incentive than the wife.  As his bargaining
power increases relative to hers, he is able to bargain for even more of her labor (125 hours per year),
leading to a total increase in her time in communal production of 310 hours per year.
Turning next to the effects of the price increases on production, income, and physical well-being in
the household, the simulation results indicate that the bargaining power effect on the former two are
minimal.  Cotton production increases by 40%.  The bargaining power effect is negative but minuscule (-
4.9 kg).  Similarly, there is a substantial increase in household income of 42%, but the (positive) bargaining
power component of the price effect is very small (200 CFA).  
For the case of household physical well-being, however, the bargaining power component of the
price effect is quite large relative to the feasibility component.  Recall that the inputs into the well-being
provisioning process are the purchased inputs of both spouses and the wife's time in reproductive activities
(equation 1).  The direct feasibility effect leads to a 5% increase in physical well-being, corresponding to
increases in the husband's purchases of well-being inputs.  The indirect feasibility effect gives the additional
effect of changes in income transfers and the wife's time in communal production holding bargaining power
fixed.  Well-being is enhanced by the wife's increased purchases of well-being inputs despite possible
reductions in her time in reproductive activities. However, the shift in the balance of bargaining power in￿￿
favor of the husband leads to a decline in household physical well-being that almost washes out the direct
(positive) feasibility effect of the price changes, leading to an overall increase in physical well-being of only
9%.
Conclusion
Macroeconomic adjustment policies that alter the price environments of rural households have the
potential to shift the balance of bargaining power between women and men in them.  For the example
considered here, that of agricultural price liberalization in Burkina Faso, both women and men were found
to benefit from the price changes.  However, they resulted in a shift in the balance of bargaining power in
favor of men, in turn increasing the share of household resources controlled by them.  Thus, while the
policy was gender neutral in its implementation, its effects were gender-biased.  
Shifts in the balance of bargaining power in households have implications not only for gender
equity, but also for households' production of cash crops, their incomes, and household members' physical
well-being.  In the Burkina Faso example, adjustment was beneficial for all three.  However, the shift in the
balance of bargaining power in favor of husbands compromised women's ability to fulfill their reproductive
roles, washing out a fairly big portion of the policy's potentially large positive effect on household physical
well-being.
The price effect estimations presented in this paper are based on a simulated household model.  The
methodology is limited in its ability to capture the true magnitude of the effects of price-induced shifts in
the balance of bargaining power.  Nevertheless, the estimates indicate that these effects may be quite large
and especially important for physical well-being outcomes such as household members' health and
nutritional statuses.  Policy makers wishing to maximize the benefits of price-shifting macroeconomic
adjustment policies for people's physical well-being should consider directing them towards enhancing the
profitability of income generating activities managed by both men and women. ￿￿
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